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Leasebacks in Commercial and Family Transactions
by J. Miles Thomas, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
A leaseback may afford a client many tax and commercial advan-
tages, if the transaction is undertaken with a thorough understanding of
the necessary requirements. However, when improperly used, a lease-
back may result in expensive and embarrassing income tax deficiencies.
The purpose of this article is to outline the general rules by which a tax-
payer can take advantage of a leaseback transaction for income tax
purposes.
LEASEBACKS
A "leaseback" for purposes of this article includes the following:
(1) A transfer of property used in a trade or business, by sale
or gift, followed by a lease of the same property from
the transferee to the transferor;
(2) A lessor acquiring property from a third person using a
cash gift or a trade in of property given by the donor-
lessee to the donee-lessor; or
(3) A lessor acquiring specific property under an installment
purchase contract from a third person for use in the les-
see's trade or business, with the rental used to satisfy the
purchase obligation.
The second and third methods above outlined are generally used in
acquiring new or used replacement property to be used in the business
of the lessee. -
ADVANTAGES OF LEASEBACKS
A valid leaseback transaction may involve one or more of the follow-
ing advantages to the seller-lessee:
(1) An improved balance sheet;
(2) Rental expense is deductible in full, whereas depreciation
is a piecemeal recovery of a portion of the asset;
(3) Depreciated business property or business property with a
low book value with respect to its current fair market
value can be sold at long term capital gain rates; and
(4) Splitting of income between related taxpayers.
An improved balance sheet results from the increased cash position
of the taxpayer, and from the substitution of the balance of the contract
receivable (assuming an installment sale to the purchaser-lessor) for the
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undepreciated balance of the asset which is sold. Also, any mortgage
indebtedness against the property is removed from the financial state-
ment.
The full rental on property used entirely in the taxpayer's trade
or business is currently deductible when paid or accrued.' Ownership of
an asset, on the other hand, requires a periodic partial cost recovery by
depreciation. 2 Depreciation does not allow full cost recovery because
of salvage value and the inability to depreciate land cost.3 Furthermore,
depreciation may involve the consequences of "recapture" when the
depreciable asset is sold or disposed of in a taxable exchange. 4 One con-
sequence of recapture is that it changes a capital gain to ordinary income.
A third possible advantage to the seller-lessee is the realization of
the current value of the subject of the leaseback transaction. It is not
uncommon in this era that the true value of an asset is in excess of the
asset's original cost as adjusted for federal income tax purposes. This is
particularly true of real property and improvements which have been
owned and used by the taxpayer over a considerable period of time.
Assuming that a depreciation recapture problem does not exist which
will turn a hoped-for tax advantage into a tax trap, substantially de-
preciated business assets can be sold with the resulting gain taxed at
long term capital gains rates.5
The practitioner is cautioned to thoroughly examine the consequences
of a sale of depreciable property before advising a client to enter into a
sale-leaseback transaction, especially with respect to the provisions on
recapture and recognition of gain on a sale of depreciable property be-
tween certain related taxpayers. 6
Leasebacks may also provide a method for splitting income between
family members, particularly children, at substantial tax savings. Gen-
erally, there would be little savings of federal income taxes in a lease-
back between husband and wife because of the desirability of filing a
joint federal income tax return. However, a Montana income tax ad-
vantage could be obtained in a husband-wife leaseback transaction, be-
cause there is no advantage in filing a joint Montana income tax return
where both spouses have income in excess of deductions and exemptions
during the taxable year.7 Leasebacks between parent and children, on
the other hand, would result in a savings of both federal and state in-
'INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954, § 162(a) (3). (Hereinafter INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1954 will be cited as I.R.C.).
2
.R.C. 1954, § 167; Reg. § 1.167(a)-l(a).
34 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 23.12, 23.50 (rev. ed. 1966).
'I.R.C. 1954, §§ 1245, 1250.
5I.R.C. 1954, § 1231.
-1.R.C. 1954, § 1239.
7REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 84-4902, establishing the rate of income tax
does not contain any provision similar to the language of I.R.C. 1954, § 2(a), pro-
viding: '"In the case of a joint return of a husband and wife . . . the tax imposed
by section 1 shall be twice the tax which would be imposed if the taxable income
were cut in half."
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come taxes, because the children would file their return separately from
the parents and usually would have less income subject to tax.
Some advantages of a leaseback transaction which may be available
to the lessor are:
(1) Use of accelerated depreciation;
(2) Use of the investment credit; and
(3) Deduction of taxes, interest, or insurance charged against
the property.
In the absence of the enactment of a proposed Congressional amend-
ment to Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code, the lessor of prop-
erty acquired for leaseback purposes can take advantage of available
accelerated depreciation methods. If the property is new, has not been
used (whether or not for business purposes) by any other taxpayer, and
has a useful life of three years or longer the Internal Revenue Code
establishes a presumption of reasonableness where an accelerated method
of depreciation is used.8 In the case of used assets, including assets not
originally used in a trade or business, the taxpayer is allowed a deduction
for "reasonable"9 depreciation of business or income producing property.
The Internal Revenue Service' ° has announced that depreciation by use
of the declining balance method using a rate not exceeding 150% of
the applicable straight line rate is permissible if its use results "... in a
reasonable allowance for depreciation, and
"(a) was elected by new taxable entitye in an initial return, or
"(b) permission to use such method has been granted by the
Commissioner, or
"(c) it was elected in the first return filed in which deprecia-
tion was sustained, or
"(d) for taxable years ending after December 31, 1953, it was
elected in the return for the first year in which the prop-
erty was subject to the allowance for depreciation regard-
less of the method of computing depreciation employed for
other depreciable property.""
The availability of the investment credit to the purchaser of prop-
erty to be used in a leaseback transaction would depend upon the type of
property involved, 1 2 its useful life, 13 and the relationship between the
parties to the transaction.14
8I.R.C. 1954, § 167(b)(2) and (c).
I.R.C. 1954, § 167(a).
'Rev. Rul. 57-352, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 150; as amplified by Rev. Rul. 59-389, 1959-2
CUM. BULL. 89.
"Ibid.
"1I.R.C. 1954, § 48.
"-I.R.C. 1954, § 48(a).
UI.R.C. 1954, §§ 48(c)(3)(A), 179(d)(2).
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The lessor in a leaseback transaction is further entitled to claim the
costs of taxes, insurance, interest on indebtedness against the leased
property, and maintenance. 15 Such deductions offset the gross rental in
arriving at the lessor's adjusted gross income.16
TESTS FOR VALID LEASEBACK ARRANGEMENTS
The courts have indicated that the substance of a leaseback trans-
action will control over the form that is adopted.' 7 In determining the
validity of a leaseback arrangement, four tests have been considered:
(1) whether there is a business purpose connected with the
transaction;
(2) whether the property was transferred at its fair market
value;
(3) the reasonableness of the rental upon the leaseback prop-
erty; and
(4) the length of term of the lease and the effect of any
options to renew.
Usually, no one of these tests is controlling.
In Riverpoint Lace Works, Inc. v. Commissioner,'8 a rental deduction
was disallowed where property was sold by a closely held corporation
controlled by two brothers and their wives to another similar corporation
with a concurrent leaseback of the property to the seller. The sale price
of the property was not commensurate with the fair market value of the
property, and there was no bona fide purpose in the transaction. The
court said:
Obviously the petitioner would be entitled to deduct rent under Sec-
tion (now 165) if it had sold its property in an arms-length trans-
action to a buyer having adverse interests and then had leased prop-
erty back at a fair rental. The same might have been true had it sold
to J & G at a price commensurate with the fair market value of the
property and then had entered into a lease made up of provisions
which adverse parties dealing at arm's-length might have agreed to,
including a reasonable rental, and particularly if the sale and lease-
back had been made by the petitioner for some good business
reason.
This decision required the taxpayer to meet three of the tests of a valid
leaseback arrangement; namely, fair market value of the property sold,
reasonableness of the rental, and a valid business purpose.
In W. H. Armstrong Co., Inc. v. Commissioner,19 the taxpayer cor-
poration was engaged in the construction business. The stock of the cor-
poration was owned principally by W. H. Armstrong and his wife. Dur-
ing the early part of World War II, the taxpayer purchased heavy con-
'I .R.C. 1954, §§ 162(a), 163(a).
"I.R.C. 1954, § 62(5).
'TVan Zandt v. ComIm'r., 40 T.C. 824 (1963).
"13 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 463, 466 (1954).
-188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1951).
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struction equipment which it sold to Mrs. Armstrong for $30,000.00. The
equipment was then leased back to the corporation, and during the first
year of the lease, over $70,000.00 was paid in rentals. The court found
that the sale was not made for the fair market value of the equipment,
that there was no legitimate business purpose accomplished by the trans-
action because the corporation's right to use the equipment was not
altered in any way, and that the rentals were unreasonable.
An earlier case involving a sale and leaseback arose over a claimed
loss on the part of the seller. In May Department Stores Co. v. Commis-
sioner,20 the taxpayer was a successor to Kaufmann Department Stores,
Inc. In 1936, Kaufmann had constructed a parking garage in downtown
Pittsburgh located across the street from his store. The property was
leased out until 1941. Between 1941 and 1943, it was operated by Kauf-
mann at a loss. In 1943, the garage was sold to a group associated with
the law firm representing the taxpayer, and concurrently leased by the
purchaser to the seller. The sale resulted in a claimed loss of approxi-
nately $2,000,000.00, which was disallowed by the Commissioner. The
tax court sustained the loss upon a finding that the title to the property
had been validly transferred to the purchasers for its fair market value;
that the purchasers were not subject to the dominion or control of the
taxpayer, and that the rental agreement, containing no renewal rights,
was reasonable.
The May Department Stores Co. case also illustrates the importance
of establishing the fair market value of the property which is to be the
subject of the leaseback transaction. Naturally, if the sale is to be made
to a disinterested third party investor, the establishment of the fair
market value of the property should be simply a matter of arm's-length
negotiation. However, if the sale is to be made to a related party, or to
one who is under the control of the seller, it will be necessary to exercise
great caution in establishing the fair market value of the property. This
is particularly true if the transaction will involve an employer's pension
or profit sharing trust because of the risk of the drastic consequences
to the qualification of the plan resulting from a prohibited transaction.2'
The practitioner would be well advised to seek independent appraisal of
any property which is the subject of a leaseback transaction to estab-
lish its fair market value unless the sale is to a disinterested third party.
In Century Electric Co. vs. Commissioner, a loss on a sale of a foundry
building with a leaseback of the property to the seller was disallowed.22
The seller sold the property to an exempt college for $150,000.00 at
which time it had an adjusted basis of $530,000.00. Concurrently the
property was leased back to the seller for a term of 95 years, with the
lessee having the right to terminate the lease at the end of 25 years, and
at other intervals during the leased period. Because the taxpayer could
-'16 T.C. 547 (1951).
-'I.R.C. 1954, § 503(c).
-192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 954 (1952).
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not establish the fair market value of the property at the time of the
transfer, the claimed loss was disallowed.
In Jordan Marsh Co. vs. Commissioner,2 3 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit distinguished the Century Electric Company case and
found that the taxpayer sustained a loss upon the sale of the property at
its fair market value. It is to be noted that both the Jordan Marsh and
the Century Electric Co. cases principally involved an attack by the Com-
missioner on the transactions as tax free exchanges because of the long
term leases.
The test of a reasonable rental becomes important when the tax com-
missioner attacks the transaction as a substitute device for distribution
of corporate profits.2 4 Such an attack may be defeated by seeking an
independent appraisal of the rental value of the property. As illustrated
by the Armston and Shaffer cases, the rental charged should not allow an
unreasonable return based on the cost of the leased property to the lessor.
It is quite common in leaseback arrangements for the rentals to be on
a net basis to the lessor. In other words, the lessee is generally required
to pay a cash rental and also to furnish all repairs, maintenance and in-
surance upon the property. In some leases, the lessee will also be directly
responsible for the payment of property taxes upon the leased premises.
An arrangement of this nature would not be struck down if the rent is
found to be reasonable. Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code does
not impose a "reasonable" test upon rentals as is the case of compensa-
tion,26 but the cases do look to the reasonableness of the rental when de-
termining whether there is in fact a substitution for distribution of cor-
porate profits.27 The rent should be computed on a uniformly reasonable
basis. If the rent dropped sharply after the early years of a lease, there
is every likelihood that the court would consider the rental excessive for
the first years. The excess would be treated as a non-deductible expense
to be amortized over the remaining life of the lase, or in the alternative,
if the lessor were a related party, as a distribution of corporate profits
to the lessor.
Another form of lease may provide that the rent shall be a percentage
of the lessor's income. In arriving at a percentage rental, the term of the
lease should cover more than one or two years, especially if the parties
to the leasing arrangement are related or there is a close association be-
tween them. There is more justification for a percentage rental in a long
term lease because a percentage rental is based on a reasonable expecta-
tion of income. Because of the probability of income fluctuation, a long
0269 F.2d 453 (2nd Cir. 1959).
24W. H. Armston Co., Inc., supra note 19.
- 1 9 4 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1952).
-I.R.C. 1954, § 162(a), provides in part: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all
the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business, including . . . (1) a reasonable allowance for
salaries . . . (3) rentals or other payments .... "' (Emphasis added).
1W. H. Armston Co., Inc., supra note 19.
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term lease will more likely be predicated upon cautious and realistic
negotiation. With a shorter lease period, the parties may tend to vary
the percentage from year to year, causing the transaction to appear as a
device for distribution of corporate profits rather than an arm's-length
rental agreement.
The client must be impressed with the importance of actually paying
the rental in a leaseback transaction. Naturally, if a disinterested third
party is to be the purchaser-lessor, the problem will probably not arise.
However, in cases of related taxpayers, the rent must be paid or the court
will be inclined to treat the transaction as a sham. In Riverpoint Lace
Works, Inc.,28 the rental quite frequently went unpaid for prolonged
periods of time. The court was quick to grasp this as a reason for treat-
ing the transaction as a sham between the taxpayer and a corporation
controlled by the taxpayer and his brother.
In Southern Ford Tractor Corporation vs. Commissioner29 the tax-
payer corporation sold its real property to a corporation controlled by
the children of the taxpayers' stockholders. Concurrently, the purchaser
executed a lease of the property back to the taxpayer providing for a
minimum rental, plus an additional rental of 1Y27% of the net sales of the
lessee in excess of the minimum rental. The lessor also acquired certain
other properties which were leased to the taxpayer. The term of the
lease was for ten years, with an option for an additional five year exten-
sion. The Tax Court allowed the transaction as a legitimate sale and
leaseback. The court discussed the use of a percentage rental as follows:
As to the 'reasonableness' of the rent, our only evidence is that of
the petitioners. The practice of fixing rentals for commercial prop-
erties on a percentage of sale basis instead of a flat rate basis is a
recognized and accepted basis. Such an arrangement is particularly
adaptable to a business which is prone to fluctuate more than usual.
That the amount of rent rises and falls with the trend of the busi-
ness and is greater in the year or years when business is best is an
accepted characteristic of a percentage lease.' Stanley Imerman,Supra.80
The Southern Ford Tractor Corporation case also discusses at great
length the importance of a business purpose and establishing the fair
market value of the property sold when dealing with related taxpayers.
The term of the lease is important to avoid an argument by the
Internal Revenue Service that the taxpayer has either engaged in a tax-
free exchange or has acquired a fee interest in the property. The regula-
tions under Section 1031, dealing with tax-free exchanges, and preceding
regulations under earlier Revenue Codes, provide that a leasehold interest
with a duration of thirty years or more constitutes a fee interest.8 1
R"Biverpoint Lame Worlks, Ino., aupra note 18.
29 T.C. 833 (1958).
"Id. at 843.
"Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(c) provides: "No gain or loss is recognized if . . . (2) a tax-
payer who is not a dealer in real estate . . .exchanges a leasehold of a fee with 30
years or more to run for real estate .... "
1966]
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In Jordan March Co. vs. Commissioner32 the taxpayer had entered
into a sale and leaseback arrangement involving a lease for-a term of
thirty years plus three days, with an option to renew for an additional
thirty years if the lessee should erect new buildings on the property.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found that there was in
fact a sale intended, and as long as there was a sale, the transaction
could not be classified as an exchange. The Internal Revenue Service has
announced that it will not follow the Jordan Marsh decision.33
In the case of Century Electric Co. vs. Commissioner,3 4 the leaseback
was for a period of ninety-five years. The term of the lease was instru-
mental in the court's determination that the transaction constituted an
exchange and not a valid sale-leaseback. However, in Century Electric
Co., the Court did allow the taxpayer to amortize the claimed loss over the
ninety-five year period of the lease.
Related to the duration of the lease is the effect of an Option to
renew a lease with an initial term of less than thirty years. It would
appear from an examination of the earlier cases that where a lease term
is for a reasonable period, and the lessee has an option to renew the
same either at the same rental or at a rental to be agreed upon subject
to arbitration by the parties, that the option period is not to be consid-
ered in determining whether or not the lease is for more than thirty
years. Although in the Jordan Marsh case there were extensive options
for renewal involved, this did not bother the court in holding that the
transaction resulted in a sale between the parties.
In City Investing Co. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner,3 5 the court
held that there was a valid sale and leaseback arrangement despite the
presence of options for renewal possessed by the lessee. However, in
dealing with options to renew the lease between related taxpayers, a
lease should be silent on the question of renewals; or in the alternative,
the initial term of the lease and any renewal period when combined,
should be less than thirty years in duration.
Whenever there is an option to repurchase the property, the court
may be requested by the Commissioner to hold that the transaction is a
shaw or constitutes a mortgage. In Leeds & Lippincott Company v.'United
States36 the taxpayer owned two hotels, and deeded a service building used
in connection with the operations of the hotels to an insurance company,
reserving an option to repurchase. The agreement provided that if the
option to repurchase was exercised, the rentals would be applied',to the
purchase price. The transaction was held to constitute a mortgage.
If it can be avoided, it would be best not to have any provision with
32Jordan Marsh Co., supra note 23.
"Rev. Rul. 60-43, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 687.
s*Century Electric Co., supra.note 22.. .
-38 T.C. 1 (1962). -
1276 F.2d 927 (3rd Cir. 1960). -
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respect to repurchase contained in a sale-leaseback transaction. Where
necessary, the repurchase option should express a purchase price com-
mensurate with the fair market value of the property, with no reduction
thereof because of payments made as rent by the seller-lessee.
LEASEBACKS IN FAMILY TRANSACTIONS
The leaseback arrangement in private family transactions is subject
to the closest scrutiny by the Internal Revenue Service. The key to a
successful family leaseback arrangement is to divorce the interest and
control of the transferor from that of the transferee.
The tests of business purpose, reasonableness of rental, and duration
of the lease are equally applicable in the family leaseback transaction.
However, the test of fair market value of the property is not often in-
volved, because generally speaking, the lessor acquires the property in an
arrangement involving a gift from the lessee.
A leading case on family leasebacks is Skemp vs. Commissioner.7
In Skemp, the taxpayer, a Wisconsin physician, created a trust with an
independent corporate trustee for a period of twenty years. The tax-
payer's wife and children were the income beneficiaries. Upon ter-
mination of the trust, the property was to be distributed among the
trustor's children. The taxpayer retained the right to rent all or a part
of the building a a rental "to be determined by he Trustee." The trustee
leased the property to the taxpayer for ten years. In ruling for the
taxpayer, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit said:
While the taxpayer voluntarily created the situation which required
the payments of rent, the fact remains that the situation created did
require the payments. In this case we have a valid, irrevocable trust,
wholly divesting the taxpayer of any interest in the trust property,
and an agreement by the taxpayer to pay the trustee a reasonable
rental under a valid lease * * * There can be no question but what
rent required to be paid is properly deductible. The trustee was duty
bound to exact rent of the taxpayer and the taxpayer was legally
bound to pay it, just as much as if the taxpayer had moved across
the street into the property of a third party. No one doubts that he
would have had to pay rent then, and would have been entitled to de-
duct it even though he had voluntarily created the situation. We are
not impressed with the argument of the Government that the tax-
payer voluntarily created the present situation.38
The Skemp case, decided in 1948, was followed in 1950 by the Third
Circuit- in Helen Brown vs. Commissioner.9 The, Skemp and Brown cases
are the foundation upon which subsequent taxpayers have attempted to
build valid family leaseback arrangements.
The important leaseback cases reaching, opposite results were de-
cided in 1965. In Van Zandt et al, v. Commissioner,40 the taxpayer lost,
-7168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
"Id. at 600.
"180 F.2d 926 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950).
-341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965), affirming Van Zandt, supra note, 17.
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but in Alden B. Oakes et al, v. Commissioner,41 the taxpayer won. An
analysis of these decisions indicates the importance of initial care by a
taxpayer seeking the benefits of a leaseback transaction.
In Van Zandt, the taxpayer was a surgeon. On April 29, 1957, he and
his wife created two Clifford type trusts with the taxpayer as trustee for
the benefit of each of their children. Thereafter, on May 23, 1957, the
taxpayer and his wife executed and delivered to the trustee a deed to
the property wherein the taxpayer's office was located, together with a
bill of sale for the office and professional equipment used by the tax-
payer in his medical practice. The property was leased back to the tax-
payer at a reasonable rental. The Internal Revenue Service asserted that
the rent was not a "necessary" expense in relation to the taxpayer's
medical practice. The tax court rejected the taxpayer's attempt to rely
upon the Skemp and Brown decisions because there was no independent
trustee. The court went on to say:
Moreover, it is well recognized that intrafamily transactions result-
ing in the distribution of income within a family unit are subject to
the closest scrutiny. * * * Where, as here, the trust and leasebacks
are steps in a prearranged transaction, we think it is necessary to
examine the true nature of the transaction and aim our inquiry to
seeing if the net effect has been a shift in family income. Clearly the
effect of this transaction, while valid, was to cause a shift of family
income and thus subvert the intended coverage of the statute. It
would seem that the economic reality, rather than the validity of the
documents cretaing the trusts, the transfer and the leases, must
serve as the basis upon which the right to the deduction rests.
To hold for the petitioner would be inconsistent with another line
of decisions. Where a sale and leaseback does not serve a utilitarian
business purpose, but is in reality a camouflaged assignment of in-
come, the expenses have not been considered 'ordinary and neces-
sary.' Since deductions are matters of legislative grace and the
taxpayer has the burden of proving he is entitled to them, the peti-
tioner here must establish that the rental payments were in fact
'ordinary and necessary' expenses in his medical practice. While they
may be ordinary, were they necessary under these circumstances?
We think not. The petitioner owned and used the building and medi-
cal equipment in his 'trade or business' before he ever created the
trusts, transferred the property to the trusts, and then leased it
back. Actually he continued to use the property in exactly the
same manner as he had before these transactions were arranged and
carried out. This indicates a lack of any business purpose, which we
believe is implicitly required by section 162(a). 42
From the foregoing it is clear the court was concerned with the sub-
stance of the transaction rather than the form. It noted that the tax-
payer, in substance, retained control of the property. Also, the taxpayer
failed to show that there was a business purpose connected with the
transaction.
In affirming the tax court's decision in Van Zandt, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also noted there was no business purpose
involved, saying:
As we should be careful lest our ruling circumscribe the flexibility
which the law--even income tax law-accords to businessmen in de-
-44 T.C. 524 (1965).
"Yan Zandt, supra note 17, at 830.
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termining what is good business purpose, we emphasize the proposi-
tion that the result ultimately depends on the factual evaluation of
the particular case. Here, factors such as the short term of the
trust, reversion to the settlors, predetermination of the right to pos-
session of the property and the like, while perfectly permissible so far
as taxability of the trust and the settlors goes, bear heavily on the
element of business purpose. In this light, and the significant dif-
ferences we point out here, we regard our holding as consistent with
Skemp v. Commissioner, 7th Cir., 1948, 168 F.2d 598, 48-1 USTC
9300.43
In Alden B. Oakes v. Commissioner,4 4 the tax court upheld the tax-
payer's right to a rental deduction. The taxpayers, an Ohio doctor and
his wife, owned property upon which was located the building in which
the taxpayer conducted his medical practice. The taxpayers created a
Clifford type trust with a bank as trustee for their four children. Sub-
sequently, the trustee leased the building to the doctor for a term of 11
years at an annual rental of $1,500.00. In addition, the lessee was to pay
all utilities, insurance, taxes, repairs and maintenance. On April 28,
1959, the doctor conveyed his interest in the property to his wife, her
heirs and assigns. The deed also specified that he was relinquishing any
remainder interest in the property held in the Clifford trust. On May
5, 1959, the mother was appointed guardian of her children.
The tax court found that the amounts paid for rentals were reason-
able and allowed a deduction of the expenses. The court said:
Again, as in I. L. Van Vandt ...we have before us that narrow
question of rental deductions, and not to whom trust income is tax-
able. Petitioners contend that the rental payments made to the
trust during the years in issue fall squarely within the provisions of
section 162(a)(3) and, therefore, are deductible as ordinary and
necessary expenses paid in carrying on Alden Oakes' medical prac-
tice. They rely on such decisions as Skemp v. Commissioner ...
Respondent relying on the Van Zandt case argues that the rental
payments made to the trust do not constitute ordinary and neces-
sary business expenses for several reasons, namely: (1) The trans-
fer of the real property to the trust merely resulted in a realloca-
tion of income among the family members because Alden Oakes did
not divest himself of control and ownership so as to warrant an
allowance of the claimed rental deduction; (2) Alden Oakes retained
the prohibited 'equity' in the property under section 162(a)(3); and
(3) He initiated the whole transaction merely to reduce his taxes,
thus serving no business purpose but only the creation of artificial
rentals.
While the line of demarcation might be thin within the Skemp,
Brown and Felix cases on one side and Van Zandt on the other, a dif-
ference nevertheless exists and we have recognized it. One of the
pivotal factors is the actual independence of the trustee. Here, unlike
Van Zandt where control over the trusts was always in the hands of
the doctor as sale trustee, the control and ownership passed from
petitioners to the Security Central National Bank, an independent
trustee. Certainly this is strongly indicative of the bona fides of the
transfer. Indeed, in other cases upholding the leaseback deduction,
the 'independent' trustees have consisted of the donor's attorney,
Brown v. Commissioner, supra, as well as his wife, father, and ac-
countant, John T. Potter, supra. We think petitioners have brought
themselves within the ambit of our decision in Albert T. Felix, supra,
where we said (p. 804):
"In the instant proceeding, the petitioners, by their
trust deed, irrevocably divested themselves of the property
"Van Zandt, aupra note 40, at 444.
"Alden B. Oake8, upra note 41.
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transferred to the trust created for the benefit of their
children. The trustee was a corporate trustee, and we find
substantial evidence to justify the inference that the trustee
did act independently and in the best interests of the
beneficiaries of the trust. We think the respondent places
undue emphasis upon the exculpatory provisions of the trust
instrument. Such a provision is not uncommon where the
trustee is not confined to legal investments but is given
broad powers of investment in the administration of the
trust. We hold that the trust was valid and is to be recog-
nized as such .... "
Still another distinguishing factor in this case, which we have taken
into consideration in weighing the bona fides of the transfer of the
real property to the trust, is that Alden Oakes has relinquished,
rather than retained, his reversionary interest.
We do not agree with respondent's second contention that Alden
Oakes retained a prohibited "equity" in the property conveyed to the
trust. Section 162(a)(3) provides that rentals are deductible only
when paid for use of property "to which the taxpayer has not taken
or is not taking title or in which he has no equity." In legal parlance
one has an "equity" in property where he has a right to redemption, a
reversionary interest, a right to specific performance, or in general
any right respecting property which traditionally would have been
enforceable by means of an equitable remedy. Oakes relinquished his
reversionary (future) interest in the trust on April 28, 1959. Clearly
he had no "equity" in the property after that date and during most of
the time covered by the years in issue * * *
Irrespective of what we said regarding business purpose in our
Van Zandt opinion, we think that where, as here, a grantor gives
business property to a valid irrevocable trust over which he retains
no control and then leases it back, it is not necessary for us to in-
quire as to whether there was a business reason for making the gift.
Admittedly, there were none. Under such circumstances, the test of
business necessity should be made by viewing the situation as it
exists after the gift is made. At that point, since Alden Oakes
needed a building for practicing medicine, he agreed to rent the
property from the trustee for a reasonable amount. Consequently,
we believe there is a sound basis for holding that the rent paid by
Oakes was in terms of section 162, both "ordinary and necessary"
and "required to be made as a condition of continued use * * * of
property." 45
The Government filed an appeal of the Oakes decision to the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, but later moved for dismissal of the
appeal. It would seem that the Government's appeal would not have
been meritorious in view of the Skemp and Brown decisions, because Dr.
Oakes went the extra step and obtain the services of an independent
trustee. In addition, he legally disclaimed any interest in the remainder of
the property after expiration of the Clifford trust. Dr. Van Zandt, on
the other hand, attempted a short cut by naming himself as trustee, and
lost. It is submitted that the Oakes and Van Zandt decisions are excellent
illustrations of the proper and improper methods of accomplishing a
family leaseback transaction.
OTHER LEASEBACK EXAMPLES
It is well known that most of the major chain department stores
for several years have been engaging in sale and leaseback transactions.
A long term lease from a nationwide chain of stores is generally suf-
ficient for a purchaser to obtain funds with which to acquire the prop-
OId. at 529-32.
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erty which has been built to specifications of the seller-lessee. The net
rental realized by the lessor is generally higher than he would realize
from a mortgage earning income on the unpaid balance. Furthermore,
an investor in such a leaseback transaction may have the advantage of
appreciation of property values.
Another area in which leasebacks have some popularity is the use
of a pension or profit sharing plan to purchase property which is then
leased to the corporation creating the plan. Many advantages can be
obtained from such an arrangement, and abuses of this practice led Con-
gress to the adoption of Section 514 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954. Section 514 covers the taxation of non-related business income and
applies to both charitable organizations and pension and profit sharing
trusts. The provisions of Section 514 should be thoroughly understood
before a pension or profit sharing trust is allowed to acquire property
for leaseback purposes.
CONCLUSION
It is hoped that this article will serve to remind the practitioner of
the necessity for laying a proper foundation to support any leaseback
arrangement The tests of business purpose, fair market value, reason-
ableness of rental, and length of term of the lease should afford the
working tools necessary to adequately weigh whether a proposed lease-
back arrangement will withstand an attack by the Internal Revenue
Service. A leaseback arrangement entered into after careful planning
and preparation, and followed by a strict compliance with the terms of
the leasing agreement, will afford the taxpayer the advantages he seeks.
1966]
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